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NOTES
THE RULE OF ROGERS v. COMMISSIONER*
THE usefulness of the general power of appointment prior to the 1942 Rev-
enue Act - as a device for avoiding federal estate taxes was attributable in large
part to a conceptualistic reading by the courts of admittedly inadequate statu-
tory provisions. 2 Typical of "elusive and subtle casuistries" 3 thereby devel-
oped was the so-called divestment theory,4 adopted by the lower federal courts 6
following Helvering v. Grinnell.u By reading local property concepts of devolu-
tion of title 7 into the word "pass" of Section 811(f) of the Internal Revenue
Code,8 it was established that if a taker in default received by appointment a
* Estate of R6gers v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 410 (1943).
1. 56 STAT. 798, 942, Revenue Act of 1942, § 403. Section 403 of the 1942 Act,
amending section 811 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code, virtually eliminates the general
power of appointment as an avoidance device. The special power is still effective, how-
ever, if carefully set up. See Eisenstein, Powers of Appointment and Estate Taxes: II
(1943) 52 YALE L. J. 494.
2. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION (1942) c. 9; Eisenstein,
Powers of Appointment and Estate Taxes: I (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 296; Griswold, Powers
of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HARv. L. REV. 929.
3. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 118 (1940).
4. In his summary of then-existing loopholes before the Ways and Means Commit-
tee, Mr. Randolph E. Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, described the
divestment theory as consisting of "principles developed by the Supreme Court and the
lower courts [which] bar the imposition of an estate tax where the recipients appointed
by the decedent are the persons who would take the property in the absence of exercise."
Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942) 91. See also H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 160; SEN. REa.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 232.
5. See Lewis v. Rothensies, 138 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) ; Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Legg's Estate
v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); Rothensies v. Fidelity-Phila-
delphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
6. 294 U. S. 153 (1935).
7. See, e.g., Freeman's Estate (No. I), 35 Pa. Super. 185, 189 (1908), approved
in Freeman's Estate, 280 Pa. 273, 277, 124 At1. 435, 436 (1924): "In the absence of an
expressed contrary intention a legacy bequeathed in default of appointment, vests in the
legatee on the death of the testator, subject to be divested by the exercise of the power of
appointment: 4 Kent's Com., 324; Fearne on Remainders, 226; Perry on Trusts, see. 250;
Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Vesey, 174." See also Matter of Lansing, 172 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E.
882 (1905). But cf. Matter of Cooksey, 182 N. Y. 92, 74 N. E. 880 (1905).
8. Prior to the 1942 amendments, section 811(f) [se~tion 302(f) of the Revenue
Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 9, 71, as amended by section 803(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932,
47 STAT. 169, 279] provided that "the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property . . . (f) to
the extent of any property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by
the decedent. ... " Not only must property "pass," but it must pass as the result of the "exer-
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lesser interest than he would have taken in default, no tax was due on that
interest.9 Since the 1942 amendments to section 811(f) do not apply to prop-
erty subject to a power of appointment by a donee dying before October 21,
1942,10 and since the divestment theory implies a conception of the proper rela-
tion of local rules of property to a scheme of federal taxation which is in con-
flict with the principle of uniformity," the recent delimitation of the divest-
ment theory by the United States Supreme Court is of more than merely his-
torical significance.
In Estate of Rogers v. Conmnissioner '2 the donee of a general testamentary
power of appointment exercised his power to create interests which were quali-
tatively different and presumably less in value than those which the appointees
would have received as takers in default under the donor's will if the power bad
not been exercised.13 The appointees did not renounce,14 and the Commis-
sioner included their interests in determining the donee's gross taxable estate.
cise" of a "general" power of appointment. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78,
81 (1940) ; Estate of Isabella C. Hoffman, 3 B. T. A. 1361 (1926). Tax immunity, when
granted, is rationalized in those cases where property has in fact been transferred pur-
suant to the active exercise of a general power of appointment by saying either that
the power is deemed not to have been "exercised" or that the property is deemed not
to have "passed" as the result of the exercise. Compare 3 REsTATE' .Ex, Pnop=" (1940)
§ 369, comment a, illus. 2, with Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 1.3 (1935). It is im-
portant from the standpoint of efficient tax administration that one or the other of these
rationales be consistently adopted. See note 25 infra.
9. For a recent statement of the divestment rationale, see Lewis v. Rothensies, 138
F. (2d) 129, 133 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943): ". . . where, according to local law, nothing
passes in the exercise of a general power of appointment when the donee appoints to the
same persons who would have taken the property in default of appointment, there is not
in such circumstances a 'passing' of the property so as to render it subject to the provi-
sions of Sec. 302(f) [i.e., 811(f)]." See also Griswold, supra note 2, at 933-38.
10. 56 STAT. 798, 941, Revenue Act of 1942, § 401.
11. See Paul, The Effect on Federal Taxation of Local Rules of Property in SE.Ecr-
an STUDiS ix FDERA. TAXATION (2d Ser. 1938).
12. 320 U. S. 410 (1943).
13. Id. at 411: "Rogers, Sr., gave his son, the decedent, a general testamentary power
of appointment over certain property, with limitations in default of appointment to the
heirs, under New York law, of the soft. On the son's death these heirs were his widow,
a daughter and a son, to each of whom would have come upon default one-third of the
property. However, the decedent did exercise his power. His will, as determined by a
decree of the Surrogate's Court of the County of New York, New York (. .. 170 Misc.
85, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 586), created the following interests so far as here relevant: a frac-
tion of the appointable property, 6.667/, went in three equal shares to the widow, the
daughter, and a grandson; of the balance, two equal shares were put in trust for the
benefit of the widow and daughter, respectively, while the other third was appointed outright
to the grandson. The decedent made no appointment to his son."
14. Renunciation by the appointees of their equitable life estates would probably have
resulted in acceleration of the remainder interests under the donce's will. See Matter of
Matthiessen, 175 Misc. 466, 23- N. Y. S. (2d) 802 (Surr. Ct. 1940) ; 2 PREsTATE!1 ET,
PRo pRTy (1936) § 231; 1 SimEs, FuTuRE INrrr~srs (1936) §§ 755-61.
THE YALE LA W JOURNAL
The Board of Tax Appeals, after finding that the interests of the appointees
were less in value than those which they would have received if there had been
no exercise of the power, reversed, 15 citing Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Company 16 and Legg's Estate v. Commissioner.'7 The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with Judge Frank and Judge Hand writing
separate opinions and Judge Chase concurring in the result, reversed the Board
of Tax Appeals and reinstated the Commissioner's original valuation.' 8 Judge
Frank argued that renunciation by the appointees was the decisive factor in
the Grinnell 10 decision. Therefore, where, as in the Rogers case, there was no
renunciation, the appointed interests, although less in value than those which
the appointees would have taken in default, constituted property passing under
a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent donee. Judge Hand,
while accepting Judge Frank's conclusion, was unwilling to commit himself
"to the absolute doctrine that in the absence of renunciation all interests ap-
pointed must inevitably pass under the power," 20 preferring to substitute for
the renunciation test the proposition that "no interests should -be excluded
from the donee's estate to whose creation the exercise of the power was neces-
sary." 21 Since, in the Rogers case, the appointees received interests which
were qualitatively different from those which they would have taken under
the donor's will if the power had not been exercised, those interests were prop-
erly included in the donee's estate. The Circuit Court's inability to agree on a
rationale illustrates the confusion caused by the Supreme Court's failure to
indicate in Helvering v. Grinnell whether the fact that the appointed interests
were identical to the interests in default or the fact that the appointees had
renounced was primarily responsible for the result reached in that case.
22
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision without explicitly
adopting either Judge Frank's or Judge Hand's rationale.2 3 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, for the majority, stated that "for the purpose of ascertaining the corpus
15. Estate of Henry H. Rogers, C. C. H. 1941 B. T. A. Serv. [ 12,230-A (B. T, A.
mem.).
16. 112 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
17. 114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
18. Commissioner v. Rogers' Estate, 135 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 2d, 19,13).
19. 294 U. S. 153, 155 (1935). Judge Frank, however, observed, "I might hesitate to
interpret Grinnell as I have . . . were it not for the subsequent decision in Helvering v.
Safe Deposit Company. . . ." Commissioner v. Rogers' Estate, 135 F. (2d) 35, 38 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1943). In Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore, 316 U. S. 56,65
(1942) the Court in discussing the Grinnell case, stated: "The subsequent renunciation by the
appointees of the right to receive by appointment and their election to take as remainder-
men in default of appointment were held by this Court to place the property subject to
the power outside the scope of § 302 (f)." It is probable, however, that the Grinll case
was primarily based on identity of interests. See Eisenstein, supra note 2, at 318 cl seq.
20. Commissioner v. Rogers' Estate, 135 F. (2d) 35, 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943);
21. Id. at 39.
22. See Eisenstein, mspra note 2, at 318 el seq.
23. Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 410 (1943).
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on which an estate tax is to be assessed, what is decisive is what values were
included in dispositions made by a decedent, values which but for such dispo-
sitions could not have existed." 24 Helvering .z. Grinnell was cited for the
proposition that "where a donee of a power merely echoes the limitations over
upon default of appointment he may well be deemed not to have exercised his
power, and therefore not to have passed any property under such a power." 2
Thus, while affirming the identity of interests interpretation of the Grinnell
case, Mr. justice Frankfurter limited the application of the divestment theory
to dispositions which merely "echo" the limitations over. The rule of the
Rogers case would seem to be that in the absence of renunciation any disposi-
tion which alters the quantity, quality, or discount value of the appointee's
interest in default 26 or which, if renounced, would not be duplicated by the
24. Id. at 413. 'Mr. Justice Frankfurter's "values which but for such dispositions
could not have existed" would appear to be similar to Judge Hand's "interests . . .to
whose creation the exercise of the power was necessary."
25. Id. at 415. If, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests, the rationale of the Grinel
case is to be interpreted as one of non-exercise rather than non-passage of title, the in-
tellectual' basis underlying the subsequent development of the Grinnell doctrine necessarily
collapses. See Eisenstein, supra note 2, at 304, 319 el seq. Under this interpretation
renunciation is no longer material in the Grinnell situation, since in any case where the
donee "merely echoes the limitations over" there is no exercise to be renounced. The
effect of renunciation where the donee has done more than merely echo the limitations
over is uncertain. See note 39 infra.
From the standpoint of efficient tax administration it is probably unfortunate that the
Court did not see fit to adopt the renunciation test. An appointee will normally n,,t
renounce unless he can reasonably expect to take under his then-existing right in default
interests equal in value to his appointed share, that is, in the Grinnell and Lewis
situations. Thus, the renunciation test would probably result in the same tax incidence
as the rule of the Rogers case, except possibly in the Lewis situation. See discussion, p.
577 infra. The gain in administrative efficiency, however, would be great.
Furthermore, it is possible that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation may have
unfortunate results under the 1942 Act. Section 403 of the 1942 Act, as amended by
section 505 of the 1943 Act, states that a preexisting general power is not taxable where
the donee dies before January 1, 1945, without having exercised it, and that a preExisting
non-general power is not taxable, regardless of when the donee dies after October 21,
1942, if the power is not exercised. It was assumed prior to the Rogers case that an
appointment to the takers in default of appointment was a taxable exercise under the new
law. This view was written into the Treasury Regulations. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105,
§ 81.24(b) (1); cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(b) (3) relating to the gift tax. The
Rogers interpretation of the Grinnell case may mean that the position taken in the regu-
lations is wrong. In any case new doubts have been created to plague the 1942 Act.
26. For the purpose of analysis a difference in quality is defined as a difference in
terms of traditional property classification (e.g., a life estate as opposed to a vested re-
mainder in fee) ; a difference in quantity as a difference in terms of dollars and cents.
acres, number of shares, etc., between the property subject to the interest in default and
that subject to the appointed interest. A difference in quantity, moreover, is to be dis-
tinguished from a difference in discount value (as of the time of the donee's death). Thus,
it is possible to have interests which are qualitatively and quantitatively identical but of
different discount value. See Lewis v. Rothensies, 138 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
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renouncing appointee's then-existing rights in default 27 is an assessable item
under section 811(f).
The metaphysical refinements of the divestment theory which Estate of Rogers
v: Commissioner is designed to dissipate are well illustrated by Lewis v. Rothen-
sies,28 decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit while the
Rogers case wV pending in the Supreme Court. In that case the donee of a gen-
eral power exercised his power to create a life estate with remainder over to his
surviving children, who were the takers in default under the donor's will."9
In holding that the Commissioner erred iri including the remainder interests
of the children in the donee's gross estate, the Circuit Court took as its major
premise the proposition that "where, according to local law, nothing passes
in the exercise of a general power of appointment when the donee appoints to
the same persons who would have taken the property in default of appoint-
ment, there is not in such circumstances a 'passing' of the property so as to
render it subject to the provisions of section 302(f)." 30 This interpretation
of the Grinnell case, which is basic to the divestment theory in that federal
tax incidence is thereby 'made to depend on local notions of passage of title,
was expressly repudiated in Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner." ' Whether or
not property has "passed" within the meaning of section 811 (f) is now a ques-
tion of federal law, to be determined without reference to local property con-
cepts.
3 2
27. For example, if A and B were the takers in default in equal shires and the
donee appointed one-half of the property to A and the other half to C, A's appointed
interest is identical from the standpoint of quality, quantity, and discount value to that
which he would have taken if the power had not been exercised. Yet, if A had renounced,
his then-existing rights in default would have entitled him to only a fourth, instead of a
half of the property. See Matter of Taylor's Estate, 121 Misc. 7, 200 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Surr.
Ct. 1923), aff'd, 209 App. Div. 299, 204 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N. Y.
582, 147 N. E. 204 (1924).
28. 138 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
29. Id. at 130: "The facts having bearing on the question here involved are that
Algernon R. Clapp . . . appointed by will in trust for his wife for life and after her
death to their two daughters outright in remainder certain properties over which lie had
a general'testamentary power of appointment under the will of his father, B. Frank Clapp
... .The will of the father provided that the trust which he created should terminate
upon the death of his widow, the death of his son and the attainment by the children of
the latter of the age of twenty-one years; and it further directed that, upon the termina-
tion of the B. Frank Clapp trust, the trustee should . . . convey to the then surviving issue
of the son, per stirpes, the whole of the trust estate 'excepting . . . such portion or
portions thereof as may have been disposed of by my surviving son . . . by his . . .
Will (s) made in pursuance of the powers hereinbefore conferred'."
30. Id. at 133.
31. 320 U. S. 410, 413 (1943) : "whether local tax legislation deems the appointed
interest to derive from the will of the donor or that of the donee of the power. . . whether for
some purposes in matters of local property law title is sometimes traced to the donee of a
power and for other purposes to the donor . . . are matters of complete indifference to
the federal fisc.",
32. Id. at 414: "Whether by a testamentary exercise of a general power of appoint-
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The fact that the Circuit Court chose an erroneous rationale in Le-wis v.
Rothensies does not necessarily mean, of course, that the Court reached an
erroneous result. It might be argued that the dispositions to the children in
that case were mere "echoes" of the limitations over upon default and that
their interests, therefore, fell within the Rogers delimitation of the Grimwll
doctrine. The children's interests under the donor's and the donee's wills were
qualitatively and quantitatively the same, that is, vested remainders in fee in
certain trust properties, the sole effect of the donee's exercise of his power
being to interpose an additional life estate. 3m Under such circumstances it
might seem, therefore, that to regard the appointee's failure to renounce as the
determining factor is "to sacrifice substance for form," since renunciation
would in no way have affected the children's then-existing interests3 4
That such an argument would prevail is doubtful, however, in view of the
Court's analysis in the Rogers case. If the donee had not exercised his power,
the children would on the death of the donee have had under the donor's will
a right to immediate possession, instead of a right to possession subject to a
life estate. The latter might conceivably be regarded as a "value" created by
the donee in exercising his power. That this "value" is worth less to the chil-
dren than the value which they would have taken under the donor's will in
default of appointment is immaterial.35 If, on the other hand, the Court should
see fit to limit its concept of assessable "values" to those "necessary to effec-
tuate the arrangements made by decedent's will," 31 it might be argued that
the children's interests under the donee's will were non-assessable "values,"
since the creation of a life estate was all that was necessary to effectuate the
dispositions desired by the donee. But in view of the general tenor of Mr. Jus-°
tice Frankfurter's opinion, it is probable that the Grinnell doctrine is to be
applied only in the case of a donee who has made no attempt to exercise his
power other than to appoint to takers in default interests in no way distin-
guishable from those which they would have taken in the absence of appoint-
ment.
ment property passed under §302(f) [§811(f)] is a question of federal law, once state
law has made clear, as it has here, that the appointment had legal validity and brought
into being new interests in property."
33. For a similar fact situation, see Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C.
1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 563 (1932). The court in that case held that the interests
appointed to the takers in default were assessable. The Supreme Court in the Gri:nclI
case, however, expressly disapproved the circuit court's decision. Helvering Y. Grinnell, 294
U. S. at 158.
34. The Circuit Court in the Lewis case made this point an alternative argument.
Lewis v. Rothensies, 138 F. (2d) 129, 136 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943): "That nothing passed
in the instant case by virtue of the donee's appointment of the trust property to his chil-
dren after the death of his wife is evident from the fact that, had the son by his will done
no more than appoint to his wife for life (as he did), his children would have tahen the
trust property in remainder just the same for that is what the donor's will provided."
35. Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 410, 413 (1943).
36. Id. at 415.
1944]
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Aside from the situation where the appointed interest differs from the inter-
est in default only in discount value, there is little doubt but that any interest
which differs from that which the appointee would have taken or which, if
renounced, would not have been duplicated by the renouncing appointees then-
existing rights in default is, under the rule of the Rogers case, to be included
in the donee's gross estate. Thus, if A and B are the takers in default in equal
shares and if the donee appoints one half of the property to A and the other
half to C, A's appointed interest is taxable, although it is the same in respect
to quality, quantity, and discount value as that which he would have taken in
default.3 7 Similarly, if the gift in default is $100,000 and the appointed share'
$60,000, or if the gift in default is an absolute remainder in $100,000 and the
appointed share a life estate in the same amount, the appointed share is, in each
instance, an assessable value. The fact that the appointed share is of a pre-
sumably lower discount value than the gift in default is immaterial. What is
decisive is the fact that in each instance the appointed share is part of a scheme
of testate distribution which is the donee's, not the donor's. Where the donee
by exercising his powers has substituted his scheme of distribution for that of
the donor, that is, where he has done more than "merely echo . . . the limita-
tions over upon default," the appointed interests are, in the absence of renun-
ciation, taxable. It is by no means certain, moreover, that tax immunity will
necessarily accompany renunciation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's emphasis on
the donee's act in shaping the devolution, coupled with an apparently deliberate
avoidance of the renunciation issue,38 may mean that renunciation is no longer
of any significance.3"
37. If the donee merely appointed one-half of the property subject to the power to C,
A as one of two takers in default would have to share the remaining one-half with B.
See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 368, illus. 1. Thus, the one-half appointed to A
is a value "which but for such dispositions could not" exist. Estate of Rogers v. Com-
missioner, 320 U. S. 410, 413 (1943). See also Commissioner v. Rogers' Estate, 135 F.
(2d) 35, 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
38. Although the Court had in 1942 specifically stated that renunciation was respon-
sible for the result reached in the Grinnell case, Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Com-
pany of Baltimore, 316 U. S. 56, 65 (1942), Mr. Justice Frankfurter made no mention
of the possible effect of renunciation in spite of the fact that one of the two judges writ-
ing opinions below had expressly relied on the Safe Deposit interpretation of the Grboiell
case.
39. In view of the Court's emphasis on the fact that the donee in the Rogers case
altered the donor's pattern of distribution, it may be that renunciation is immaterial unless
it restores the donor's pattern of distribution. Since the donor's pattern would be restored
only where the donee merely "echoes" the limitations over and since in those circum-
stances there is no "exercise" to be renounced, it may be that renunciation has no tax
consequences. See note 25 supra. It can easily be argued, however, that any disposition
by a donee is non-existent to the extent that local law ignores it once the appointee re-
nounces. See note 32 supra.
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VULNERABILITY OF PATENTS TO ATTACK IN
ANTI-TRUST SUITS*
FORECLOSURE of attack on monopolies by demonstration of the invalidity of
patents used as sanctions for price-fixing agreements is threatened by the recent
district court decision in United States z,. United States Gypsunm Company.'
The United States brought an action under the Sherman Act,2 alleging that
the defendants had used certain patent license agreements to effect a combina-
tion and conspiracy in restraint of trade. The complaint 3 expressly alleged
that the patents were invalid on the grounds, among others, of lack of inven-
tion, existence of a prior art, and prior publication. The defendants' motion
for partial judgment 4 dismissing that allegation was granted. the court ruling
that without statutory authority the Government may not attack the validity
of patents except for fraud.
The opinion of the majority was based in part on two cases involving gov-
ernmental grants of land r for the proposition that the Government cannot
show that a patent was issued by mistake or error, and on United States v.
American Bell Telephone Conipany 11 for the rule that an attack by the Govern-
ment on the validity of letters patent is permitted only in the case of fraud.
While principles controlling grants of land have frequently been considered
analogous to those controlling the issuance of patents for inventions,' the
* United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 59 U. S. Pat. Q. 318 (D. D. C. 1943).
1. 59 U. S. Pat Q. 318 (D. D. C. 1943). But see Bland, J., dissenting, id. at 333.
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4 (1940).
3. The relevant parts read: "Many of the patents mentioned and described in said
license agreements by which the said combination has been, and is being carried out in
part, are process or machine patents. The article and product claims of . . . [the] pat-
ents . . . mentioned . . . in said license agreements . . . are each invalid and void for
each of the following reasons: (a) there is no real invention or novelty . . . (b) the
claims . . . disclose no patentable invention in view of the prior act . . . (c) the alleged
inventions . . . were shown and described in printed Vublications in the United States
more than two years prior to the filing of . . . applications; (d) the alleged inventions
. . . are inoperative and devoid of novelty and utility: (e) the . . . inventions . . .
were abandoned by the inventor and he was guilty of laches . . . (f) the . . . inventions
were not reduced to practice until after other inventors had invented and reduced the same
to practice and applied for patents thereon; (g) the . . . inventions are described in
ambiguous and not in properly clear, concise and exact terms and (h) the defendants have
been informed of the invalidity of the claims of the . . . patents and have unreasonably
faild to file . . . any disclaimer. . . ." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 59
U. S. Pat. Q. 318,321 (D. D. C. 1943).
4. The motion was one to strike the paragraph in question upon the gruund that the
allegations thereof were immaterial and impertinent to the issues in the case, or, in the
alternative, for partial judgment.
5. United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472 (1921), and Burke v. Sf,uth-
ern Pacific R. R., 234 U. S. 669 (1914).
6. 167 U. S. 224 (1897).
7. Compare Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434 (U. S. 1871); United States v.
American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224 (1897).
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circumstances of the land cases cited indicate that their holdings would not
control either the situation of the principal case or those involved in other land
cases which apparently establish contradictory principles. In the first land
case 8 relied upon by the court, United States v. Coronado Beach Company,
the Government had attempted to show that the extent of a grant under which
a private party claimed land, which the Government sought to condemn, was
erroneous. The Supreme Court held that the extent of the grant was validly
determined in the patent and the patent conclusive on the United States. It
would seem that this holding has little bearing on the issue of the Gypsum
case because a statute 9 made the land grant in question conclusive upon the
United States. Statutes regulating the issuance of patents for inventions 10 estab-
lish no similar finality. Moreover, since the extent of the land patent was
the object of controversy,"1 the issue was primarily one of construction,' not
of validity. The second land case 12 held that strangers, who had no interest
in the land at the time of the issuance of the patent, could not attack the pat-
ent's validity. This holding could hardly be extended to prevent attack by the
Government, which was clearly not a stranger to the original grant.
Several land cases hold, moreover, that the attorney general may bring a suit
in equity to cancel a patent issued by mistake particularly if the mistake was of
such a character that it might be deemed an unauthorized act.18 In United
8. United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472 (1921). ". . . although it
well may be that in view of the purpose set out in his petition [the original patentee's for
the grant] and the circumstances the grant could have been construed more narrowly, that
was a matter to be passed upon and when the decree and the patent went in favor of the
grantee it is too late to argue that they are not conclusive against the United States."
Id. at 488.
9. 9 STAT. 634 (1851). Cf. the language of the district court in United States v.
Coronado Beach Co., 274 Fed. 230, 234 (S. D. Cal. 1919) : "In construing this section,
the Supreme Court, in the case of Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238, says: 'The fif-
teenth section declares that . . . any patent issued under the act, "shall be conclusive
between the United States and the said claimants only ;" that is to say, it shall be conclu-
sive on the United States . . .. . . . The statute and said decision is to the effect that
the patent shall be conclusive on the United States." Id. at 234.
10. 35 U. S. C. §§ 1-88 (1940).
11. "The more serious questions . . . concern primarily the extent of the grant
." United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472, 486 (1921). The extent of a
land grant would seem comparable to the scope of a patent for invention. Yet in anti-trust
suits courts may inquire "into the prior art to ascertain the scope of the claims of the va-
rious patents involved." United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 33 F. (2d) 617 (N. D.
Ill. 1929) ; see United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 248 (1942). Therefore, the
holding in United States v. Price, 111 F. (2d) 206 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), that the court may
not look to antecedent proceedings on which a governmental land grant was founded to deter-
mine the extent of the grant seems inapplicable to the situation in the principal case.
12. Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R., 234 U. S. 669 (1914).
13. United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525 (U. S. 1864) ; Hughes v. United States, 4
Wall. 232 (1866); McLaughlin v. United States, 107 U. S. 526 (1882); Mullan &
Another v. United States, 118 U. S. 271 (1"886); Germania Iron Co. v. United States,
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States v. Stone '4 the United States had by mistake issued a patent to land
reserved from sale as a military reservation in a prior treaty. It was held that
the patent was "but evidence of a grant" and void for lack of authority. This
decision was followed by the Supreme Court in a later case 15 which affirmed
the cancellation of a grant of land approved by the Secretary of the Interior
in his mistaken belief that certain coal lands were not mineral lands within
the exemptions of the controlling act. The rule of the Stone case was further
extended by the Supreme Court in a case where letters patent had inadvertently
been issued to a third party by a clerk in the Interior Department while a
motion for rehearing on two rejected applications was pending.16 The court
allowed cancellation of the patent, although the mistake consisted merely of
noncompliance with a departmental rule. Two more recent cases reaffirm the
same doctrine.'
7
Similarly the holding in the American Bell Telephone case I does not neces-
sarily stand for the proposition that fraud is the only permissible ground on
which the Government may attack the validity of patents. In the Bell case
the attorney general brought a suit in equity to cancel a patent for a telephone
receiver alleging fraud and lack of patentability. The Supreme Court held that
no fraud was proven and that the mere possibility that the Patent Commission-
er's judgment might have been erroneous did not confer authority on the Attor-
ney General to bring a cancellation suit on the same facts as were before the
Commissioner. It is improbable, however, that the Court intended to restrict its
equitable power to set aside a patent to cases of fraud, for the opinion explicitly
165 U. S. 379 (1893); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181 (1926); Southern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
675 (1931).
14. 2 Wall. 525 (U. S. 1864).
15. Mullan & Another v. United States, 118 U. S. 271 (1886). The court cited The
Stone case for the proposition that "the patent is but evidence of a grant, and the officer
who issues it acts ministerially and not judicially. If he issues a patent for land reserved
from sale by law, such patent is void for want of authority." Id. at 278. Cf. McLaughlin
v. United States, 107 U. S. 526 (1882).
16. Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U. S. 379 (1893). Appellants contendea
that the Government's bill could not be sustained because no fraud was proved. Id. at
382. In this connection ir. Justice Brewer's language is very pertinent to the principal
case. Although he stressed that "a patent from the United States is a solemn muniment
of title not lightly to be challenged or set aside, and all that has ben heretofore said in
support of the sanctity of such an instrument we reaffirm," id. at 312, he rejected the con.
tention that absence of fraud should bar the Governmeit's action, because "if such omih-
sion can be operative to deprive the land department of its appropriate jurisdiction, it
affords too strong an inducement for an intentional omission, proof of which may well lh1:
beyond the power of the government." Id. at 385.
17. United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181 (1926) (actiun by the United Statw-
to recover Indian land erroneously patented as swamp lands), and Southern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 51 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 075 (1931).
18. 167 U. S. 224 (1897).
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states the principle that a suit in equity by the United States is the proper remedy
for relief when a patent has been granted "by mistake or accident." 11 In the light
of this language it would appear that the holding does not exclude evidence of a
patent's invalidity in all instances, but applies only to cases where lack of author-
ity is a debatable point for which no fitting or new evidence in introduced. Since
lack of sufficiently clear evidence niay also have been a factor in the Coronado
case, neither of these cases contradict the principle that the Government may
attack a patent issued by fraud or mistake.
It may be argued, however, that neither the land cases nor the Bell case
are controlling authorities for the Gypsum case, because they represented direct
and not collateral attacks against allegedly invalid patents. But, as the major-
ity recognizes, the reasoning of the Bell case seems "as apt for incidental attack
upon the validity of patents as for direct attack." 20 The issue presented by
19. Although the holding of the Bell case seems clear, it has been much debated.
Walker on Patents cites the case for the-rule that equity has jurisdiction to repeal Letters
Patent for invention where they were issued "by any such mistake as those for which
courts of equity grant relief . . . whenever the United States files a bill of complaint,
stating the facts and praying that the Letters Patent may be annulled," although this
jurisdiction "does not 'extend to error of judgment in deciding any debatable question of
difference of invention." 2 WALKER, PATENTS (Deller's ed. 1937) § 233 (emphasis sup-
plied). Likewise Mr. Woodward suggests that the decision "may be inapplicable when
the existence of invention is questioned, as by bringing evidence of the prior art ad the
like." Woodward, Cancellation of Patents on Ground of Invalidity (1943) 25 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc. 264, 267. If Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion is read in the light of the lower
court decision, which it affirmed, such a construction seems inescapable. There it was
said: "The examiner and the board had before them all the facts bearing on this bratch
of the case which we now have, and understood the law . . . ; so that the patent was
issued under no mistake of either law or fact." American Bell Telephone Co. v. United
States, 68 Fed. 542, 565 (C. C. A. 1st, 1895). Thus the holding was not that no repeal
coiild be had because of mistake, but simply that there was no mistake. Accordingly, the
language of the Supreme Court which seems to indicate a prohibition of all cancellation
suits except those brought for fraud is dictum at most. Even as such its meaning as modi-
fied by other dicta in the same opinion seems not to be the one given it by the court in
the Gypsum case. Thus the Court said: "In United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
: , * [159 U. S. 548 (1895)] it was decided that where a patent for a grant of any kind
issued by the United States has been obtained by fraud, by mistake, or by accident, a
suit by the United States against the patentee is the proper remedy for relief. . . . But
. . . there was no attempt to define the character of the fraud . . . or mistake, or the
extent of* the error as tb power which must be established. . . It was not affirmed
that proof . . . of any error . . . was sufficient." United States v. Bell Telephone Co.,
167 U. S. 224, 269 (1896). The plain meaning of this language is that the court did not
hold the alleged error in the particular case substantial enough to warrant a proceeding
to vacate the patent. But the view of the principal case that the Bell doctrine limits can-
cellation suits to instances of fraud has been adopted by a few commentators. See Wood-
ward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law
(1942) 55 HAv. L. Rzv. 950, 956; Greenberg, Present Trends in Collateral Attacks on
Patent Validity (1942) 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 746, 750; (1944) 57 HARV. L. REv. 388.
20. United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 59 U. S. Pat. Q. 318, 333 (D. D. C. 1943).
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either class of case is essentially one of estoppel,21 and there seems to be little
reason to hold the Government estopped from attacking its own grant in one
situation and not in the other. While the apparently conflicting holdings of 0
the cases in respect to the issuance of land patents might suggest a distinction
based on a rule correlating permissibility of attack with its directness, accept-
ance of this theory would merely double the number of suits to be brought in
an anti-trust proceeding. In view of increasing unwillingness to allow pro-
cedural niceties to slow the. pace of law "without the warrant of clear neces-
sity," 22 the court can hardly be supposed to have acted on such a theory in
the Gypsum case.
It would seem, moreover, that the generally accepted rule that estoppel will
not lie against the Government and that the United States is not bound by
unauthorized acts of its officers 23 is well applicable to the Gypsum case. Since
the controlling statute authorizes the Patent Office to issue patents only when
21. It is argued in defendants' brief that the question of estoppel is "wholly irrele-
vant" to the issue, since the presence of estoppel would imply a right to attack the validity
of a patent in the absence of circumstances creating the estoppel, and it is that latter
right which is denied. Brief for Defendants, pp. 21-24, United States v. U. S. Gypsum
Co., 59 U. S. Pat. Q. 318, 333 (D. D. C. 1943). But the right in question wvas recog-
nized in United States v. Stone, 2 XVall. 525 (U. S. 1864), and in Mowry v. Vhitney,
14 Wall. 434 (U. S. 1871), as the modern equivalent of the old English scire facias prac-
tice for the repeal of royal grants. See Woodward, Cancellation of Patents on Ground of
Invaldity, (1943) 25 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 266. Moreover, it seems more realistic to think of
different departments of the government specifically rather than to use the blanket term
"government." That federal courts, which are agencies of the Government, have the
right to review administrative acts of the Government without express statutory permis-
sion has recently been laid down by the Supreme Court. Stark v. Wickard, 64 Sup. Ct.
559 (1944).
22. Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting, in Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191, 209. "A system
of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to
justice without the warrant of clear necessity." Id. at 209. Cf. I MooRE, FEDM.AL PRAC-
TIcE (1938) 4, 175.
23. Act of an agent can never bind principal by way of estoppel, unless it is within
the scope of his agency. The Government is not bound by estoppels under an instrument
created by itself. Johnson v. United States, 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7419 (C. C. Me. 1830).
The principle that estoppel will not lie against the United States and that the govern-
ment is not responsible for unauthorized acts of its officers "is so elementary and well
established that citations of authority do not seem necessary. . . ." Sternfeld v. United
States, 32 F. (2d) 789, 790 (N. D. N. Y. 1929). United States v. Carbon County Land
Co., 46 F. (2d) 980 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931), and cases there cited. United States v. Crary,
1 F. Supp. 406 (NV. D. Va. 1932).
"Suits may be maintained by the Government in its own courts to set aside one of
its patents .. .when it is necessary in order to enable it to discharge its obligations to
the public . . . [In that case] it has all the privileges and rights of a sovereign. The
statutes of limitation do not run against it. The laches of its own officials does not debar
its right." United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224, 264 (1897).
". .. local rules of estoppel will not be permitted to thwart the purposes of statutes of
the United States." Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176 (1942) (patent
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there is an invention of a new and useful art and no prior public use,24 lack
of authority would be established by new evidence showing that the invention
-was anticipated in the prior art or that some other condition existed which
made the statute inapplicable. 25 In addition, a rule preventing a showing of
lack of authority by holding the Government estopped from pleading invalidity
would make the issuance of letters patent conclusive on the patent's validity.
Yet since Reckendorfer v. Faber letters patent have been held entitled only to
a prima facie presumption of validity,28 and on at least one occasion a court has
on its own motion held a patent invalid when in its opinion it lacked inven-
tion.2 7 The inventor's right to appeal from the Commissioner of Patent's deci-
sion 28 or to file a bill in equity to obtain a patent 29 as well as the defense of
invalidity possible in irfringement suits 30 show plainly that the Commission-
er's finding is not intended to be conclusive in every instance. The Government
itself has the statutory right to avail itself of all defenses that may be pleaded
by a private defendant in an action for infringement.3 '
Considerations of public policy would make it seem deviational if the Gov-
ernment while free to plead invalidity when doing battle in a proprietory ca-
pacity should be "estopped" from doing so when defending the public interest
in its sovereign capacity. Likewise they should caution against a rule which
burdens the public with a patent that a threatened private interest could de-
feat.3 2 The court's opinion in the Gypsum case suggests that a governmental
licensee not estopped to challenge a price-fixing clause in his license agreement by show-
ing patent's invalidity).
24. 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35 U. S. C. §31 (1940).
25. The responsibility of determining limits of statutory authority of administrative
agencies is a judicial function. Stark v. Wickard, 64 Sup. Ct. 559, 571 (1944).
26." Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347 (1875). See Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S, 187,
196 (1876) ; Julius Kaiser & Co. v. Rosedale Knitting Co., 98 F. (2d) 839, 840 (C. C. A.
3d, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 649 (1938) (presumption of validity does not arise when
interfering applicants agreed to arbitrate priority with the purpose of forming a patent
pool) ; 48 C. J. (1929) § 258. Statistical studies indicate that a high percentage of patents
tested in the courts are found invalid. See Evans, Disposition of Patent Cases by the
Courts (1942) 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 19; Federico, Patents in the Circuit Courts of Appeal,
1925 to 1936 (1938) 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 72.
27. Slawson v. Grand Street R. R., 107 U. S. 649 (1882). "If they [the letters pat-
ent] are void because the device or contrivance described therein is not patentable, it Is
the duty of the court to dismiss the case on that ground, whether the defence be made
or not. It would ill become a court of equity to render a money decree .. .for the in-
fringement of letters patent which are void on their face for want of invention." Id, at
652.
28. 53 STAT. 1212 (1939), 35 U. S. C. § 59a (1940).
29. Ibid., 25 U. S. C. § 63 (1940).
30. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), as amended 53 STAT. 1212 (1939), 35 U, S. C. §69 (1940).
31. 36 STAT. 851 (1918), as amended 40 STAT. 705 (1918), 35 U. S. C. § 68 (1940).
32. Ordinarily private infringement suits test the validity of patents. But when all
users of the patent are parties to license agreements and primarily interested in ihe main-
tenance of fixed prices, this test is not likely to be applied.
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attack on a patent would constitute a breach of faith.m But it would appear
that the Government never promises monopoly rights without the fact of inven-
tion. A showing that no invention justifying a patent was made by a patentee
should, therefore, terminate a grant of patent privileges for failure of a condi-
tion precedent.3 4 In fact, a subsequent declaration of invalidity may still leave
the patent owner with a gratuitous profit made at the expense of the public
during a possibly considerable period.
Nor does the argument that the Attorney General should not be allowed
to overrule another government department commend itself. The powers of
the patent office are narrowly limited by statute, and suggestions which have
been made 35 for enlarging them, have not yet been enacted. In the absence of
such a statute, it would seem that the Attorney General, who has the specific duty
to enforce the anti-trust laws, is the only officer who can prevent the use of an in-
valid patent after its issuance. The language of recent Supreme Court decisions
indicates that the often recognized abuses of the patent system .0 are no longer
viewed with complacency. Indeed, the Court seems to have invited by a num-
ber of dicta in other anti-trust cases the attack which the decision in the Gypsum
case foreclosed.3 7 It is difficult to reconcile with such a policy a decision which
may bestow immunity from prosecution under the anti-trust acts on a patentee
without benefit of invention.
33. Compare the similar line of argument in Greenberg, Recent Trends in Collateral
Attacks on Patent Validity (1942) 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 746.
34. Patents have been considered contracts between the inventor and the Government,
the consideration on the part of the inventor being his disclosure of the invention "in
such plain and full terms that any one... may practice it." Fried. Krupp Aktien-Gesell-
schaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 Fed. 588, 594 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911), cert. denicd, 230 U. S.
728 (1912); H. C. White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Son Co., 20 F. (2d) 311, 313
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 547 (1927). Accordingly,
it may be argued that if the fact of lack of invention is established, the contract must fail
for want of consideration, and the Government is no longer bound by its grant.
35. See S. 2491,77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ; cf. HAmI.rON, TNEC REP., PATENTs AND
FREE ENTERPRISE 168, Monograph 31 (1941) ; Woodward, stpra note 19; Letter to Creek-
more Fath, General Counsel for the Senate Patent Committee, from Edwin M. Borchard,
June 8,1942.
36. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661, 6C6 (1944);
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U. S. 84, 92 (1941) ; Mdorton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 492 (1941). Hamilton gives a comprehensive
survey of uses and abuses. HALTON, op. cit. supra note 35.
37. "Inasmuch as the Government did not appeal from these findings, we need not
consider .. .the validity or scope of the .. .patents. . . ." United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 283 U. S. 163, 181 (1931). "In considering that question we assnlne the validity of
the patents, which is not questioned here." Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S.
436, 456 (1940). "We assume arguendo that the patents in question. . . are valid." United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 276 (1942). "The record gives no account of
the prior art and does not provide us with other material to which, if available, resort
might appropriately be had in determining . . . the validity and scope of the patent
claims....'" United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 248 (1942) (italics sup-
plied).
